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Assessing the Effects of New and Old Conservation Policies
in Costa Rica
Danielle Knight
Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT
Cost Rica’s national conservation policy was recast into SINAC (National System of Conservation Areas) about a
decade ago (World Bank 2000). Major changes in the new policies include pairing the management of biodiversity
and the management of sustainable development and resource use (SINAC website, 2007). This change sparked
criticism and many worried that the shift might leave policy in favor of development instead of sheer protection for
biodiversity. SINAC also changed the administrative structure of conservation management and condensed seventyeight different territories into eleven conservation areas spanning all of Costa Rica’s territory (Evans 1999). Recent
studies show that the state of conservation policy and its effectiveness in the country is less an effect of new policies
than it is the way funding travels between the central government and Conservation Areas. These areas generate
enough money to sustain the country’s conservation goals but the central government does not return enough of the
generated revenue for these goals to be realized.

RESUMEN
La política nacional de la conservación en Costa Rica fue modificada en SINAC (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de
Conservación) hace alrededor de una década (World Bank 2000). Los cambios principales en las nuevas políticas
incluyen la conjunción de la gerencia de la biodiversidad y de la gerencia del desarrollo y del uso sostenibles del
recurso (SINAC website, 2007). Este cambio desató críticas y muchos se preocuparon que el cambio pudiera dejar
la política en favor del desarrollo en vez de la protección de la biodiversidad. SINAC también cambió la estructura
administrativa de la gerencia de la conservación y condensó setenta y ocho diversos territorios en once áreas de
conservación que atravesaban todo el territorio de Costa Rica (Meffe and Carroll 1997). Las entrevistas conducidas
aquí y otras investigaciones sugieren que el estado de la política de la conservación y de su eficacia en el país es un
efecto menor de las nuevas políticas que de la manera que fluye el financiamiento entre el gobierno central y las
áreas de la conservación. Estas áreas generan bastante dinero para sostener las metas de la conservación del país
pero el gobierno central no vuelve bastante del dinero generado para que estas metas sean observadas (Hernández,
comunicación personal).

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many have begun to abandon conservation policies that approach biodiversity
protection without considering a human presence. These traditional conservation tactics assign
protected areas as reserves that no one should trespass onto. Countries whose population growth
rates indicate a need for more development adopt more “counter-narrative” conservation
planning, however. This model incorporates both the need for conservation but does not ignore
the effects of human activity on the environment. Human needs are and will continue to increase
with more population; thus, countries will have to develop ways of utilizing their natural
resources without having exhaustive effects on them (Campbell 2002). Initiatives for sustainable
development have already begun among global organizations like the World Conservation
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Strategy and Caring for the Earth (Campbell 2002). Costa Rica has been a forerunner in
sustainable conservation policy in Latin America, though the extent to which policies are
observed is questionable. Recent changes under the country’s national conservation policy also
juxtapose conservation and development. The new conservation system, the National System of
Conservation Areas (SINAC), intends to conserve and protect biodiversity as well as promote
sustainable development and sustainable use of Costa Rica’s natural resources (Meffe and
Carroll 1997).
Over twenty years ago, Costa Rica lacked the scale of eco-tourism and conservation
practice it observes today. The country faced enormous international debt, one of the world’s
largest growing population rates and a legal system that largely promoted deforestation (Meffe
and Carroll 1997).
The heaviest deforestation occurred in the 70’s and early 80’s, when the country had one
of the world’s highest deforestation rates. At this time there was also heavy governmental
pressure to deforest so that the country could gain profits in wood exports. There were also many
governmental incentives for agriculture and pasture production (Kishor and Constantino 1993).
Then in 1986 the President Arias Sanchez administration created MIRENEM (Ministry
of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines). Under MIRENEM, seventy-eight different territories
were controlled by the National Parks Service, the General Forestry Directorate, the Wildlife
Service and the National Indian Affairs Commission. The Organization for Tropical Ecosystem
(OTS) Studies and the Tropical Science Center (CCT) also helped to manage and financially
support the different regions (Meffe and Carroll 1997).
Before the establishment of SINAC, different government agencies controlled the
seventy-eight protected territories. Management by these different governing bodies made
effective communication difficult and many judged the personnel managing these areas as
unskilled and lacking enough resources to carry out conservation on a large scale. Those
working in the field also were and are still likely to be poorly experienced (Brockett and
Gottfried 2002). The conservation system’s past had also been plagued by insufficient funding
and helpful management for a long time. The World Bank found that attitudes of employees
mirrored this dysfunction: “[T]he DGF admits to low morale and an inability to control wasteful
deforestation or to implement incentive programs due to insufficient funding and staffing”
(Evans 1999).
In 1993 the World Bank published a review analyzing conservation and forestry in Costa
Rica. The review concluded that Costa Rica needed to improve the financial management of its
national parks, which they suggested might be achieved through higher entrance fees. The
World Bank also urged the country to gear their conservation efforts more on forest protection
independent of sustainable development. The review also reported that 66% of the forest
services in Costa Rica are enjoyed globally and that these add up to between US$119 and 286
million annually. They reason that the rest of the world needs to compensate Costa Rica for their
efforts and success in managing and protecting their natural environment (De Camino et al.
2002).
Two years later, the government reorganized its conservation system. Under the former
conservation setup, many duties and responsibilities overlapped among the different agencies.
The system was overly bureaucratic and inefficient, making the different areas disjointed from
one another. Implementing SINAC was supposed to remedy these conditions. The new system
was supposed to make management more consolidated and efficient, allow a unified biological
basis in protection and also invoke more participation by the local community. The change also
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included sustainable development and sustainable resources use into conservation policy. Thus,
SINAC was left to manage both biodiversity protection and sustainable development, an addition
which earned ample political support (Meffe and Carroll 1997).
This change came in 1995 when MIRENEM and MAE (Ministry of the Environment)
were consolidated into MINAE (Ministry of the Environment and Energy). The seventy-eight
parks and reserves were then consolidated into eleven conservation areas, covering all Costa
Rican territory. MINAE assigned control of these areas to SINAC (National Systems of
Conservation Areas), whose existence was officially legalized with Biodiversity Law 7788 in
1998 (World Bank 2000). The SINAC administration includes the National Council of
Conservation Areas, an Executive Department, the Conservation Areas, Regional Councils, and
Local Councils (World Bank 2000).
The main reforms included in SINAC’s structure include decentralizing control away
from a main San Jose location and giving more power to local regional offices. Regional
management could make more decisions, handle staffing and include opinions from local
communities in their planning. Ideally, SINAC wants to make each region self-sufficient so that
civil society can one day independently manage their own region, requiring less support from the
central government. Under SINAC, the government also wanted to make each AC
(Conservation Area) more financially independent. SINAC policy states that each region should
reach towards generating 50% of its income independently, 15% from international support,
15% from endowments, trust funds and debt swaps and 20% from the Costa Rican’s
government’s general budget (Meffe and Carroll 1997).
Some groups and individuals criticized the reorganization under MINAE and SINAC,
especially the fact that these agencies would be handling biodiversity protection and sustainable
development simultaneously. The José Maria Figueres Administration (1994-98) has been
described as wanting to turn Costa Rica into a grand project for sustainable development,
“offering itself to the world as a ‘laboratory’ for this new development paradigm” (Brockett and
Gottfried 2002). Costa Rica’s “sustainable drive” worries some conservationists, especially now
that it is included in the country’s conservation strategies.
Many think the combined management of biodiversity protection and sustainable use can
be a dangerous change. If development usually yields more economic profit than biodiversity
protection and they fall under the same governing agency, there is the likelihood that
development would receive more funding and attention, leaving biodiversity at risk. The
director of AECO, an independent Costa Rican conservation group, claimed that SINAC would
bring more harmful resource exploitation and could build more construction in environmentally
fragile areas (Evans 1999). Decentralizing the conservation duties is a key feature of SINAC, a
large worry to many conservationists also. Local management might receive heavy local
pressures that would compromise original goals for biodiversity protection. Many rural
communities are also considered to be less preservationist, making localized conservation
management in these communities less trustworthy (Brockett and Gottfried 2002).
Here I try to assess the effectiveness of the new SINAC system. I will evaluate how
effective the administrative changes has improved management in the Conservation Areas and
whether decentralization has hindered biodiversity protection. If decision making is left up to
regions and local communities, this might leave opportunity for local interests to influence
conservation agendas. To do this, I will look for differences in money allocated to biodiversity
protection and related projects and assess whether or not there has been a negative change in the
amount of attention and concern for biodiversity in Conservation Areas.
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METHODS
I conducted interviews with Walter Bonilla, the Monteverde Conservation League’s accountant
and Carlos Hernández, the Director of the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve. My questions for
them related to their opinions about the efficiency of SINAC, the state of finances with the
system, their perceived level of local community participation and suggestions for future changes
in conservation policy (Appendix 1).
I also created and sent questionnaires for the directors of each AC in Costa Rica. These
questions asked the director in most cases to compare conditions in their conservation area to
before and after the creation of SINAC (Appendix 2). Ten questionnaires were submitted to
directors of each Conservation Area except for La Amistad Caribe because the regional office
did not answer their phones and I was unable to get contact information for the area’s director.
Of the ten submitted, only one answered questionnaire returned from Fernando Quiros, the
director of the Coco Island AC.
I gathered additional information through outside research, using previous studies
examining Costa Rica’s conservation policies. I also obtained SINAC budgetary information
from Jorge Gamboa, an employee in San Jose’s MINAE location and specific budgetary
information about Poas National Park from Adriana Murrillo, the park’s accountant.
All research collection and interviews were performed in person and by phone in
Monteverde, Costa Rica.

RESULTS
The changes established under SINAC have changed the way conservation is handled mostly on
an administrative basis. Whether or not the change has caused a discrepancy in the amount of
attention and money given to biodiversity protection and sustainable activities is less evident.
This is because many of the new SINAC decrees have not actually been developed due to lack of
funds. The areas are not as self-sufficient as the SINAC goals proposed because the central
government prevents them from financially supporting themselves independently. Thus, this
study does not show that SINAC’s dual control of sustainable development and sustainable
resource use has affected the amount biodiversity protection significantly. There are, however,
still successes and problems that persist in SINAC and its governing agencies, MINAE and the
central government. While some of these observations are directly associated with SINAC
changes, most are associated with several contributing factors. The following table note these
conservation successes and problems.
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CURRENT STATE OF CONSERVATION UNDER SINAC
Ideological
Conservational
Financial
Administrative/Ope
rative
Pros



Costa Rica adopts
sustainability as a
national objective



plans are in progress to
monitor management
and tourism



SINAC allows many
to contribute to
conservation
practices



have established
environmental
education programs for
AC personnel

local communities
are able to visualize
the economic
necessity and value
of biodiversity







Cons



biodiversity always
approached as a
resource



influence of local
rural communities
may counter
conservation interests



more personnel
working than now
before SINAC



local regional
commissions are active
and participative in
their ACs

SINAC creates
Biodiversity Law
No. 7788



local management
allows people to obtain
permits easier

people can manage and
utilize their local
resources efficiently



SINAC system has
become more stable in
the past years



richer ACs able to
support the poorer ones



local managers will be
more familiar with their
field



lack sufficient amount
of personnel to handle
all responsibility



ACs overly dependent
on central government
for funding



overdependence on the
government prevents
them from operating
efficiently and selfsufficiently



facilities in poor
condition



outside pressures still
threaten



monitoring in protected
areas is not continuous







may lead to
overexploitation of
natural resources
laws against
deforestation and other
malpractice not heavily
enforced
reforestation policy is
fairly new





ACs receive outside
funds from donors (ex.
FUNDECOR and
Tropical Science
Center)
conservation budget
project in progress to
better fund ACs



central government
returns small
percentage of funds
back to Acs



these returned
percentages vary from
year to year



central government
decides how to divvy
funds across ACs



central government
controls how each AC
uses their funds



tourism industry does
not support ACs



basic operative costs
often not covered by
government



reduction in
international aid to ACs
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DISCUSSION
Ideological Issues.
CON. At one point, Costa Rica’s sustainable activity may evolve into utilizing environmental
and biological resources at such a high capacity that it will be become harmful to the
environment. Many communities often place more economic value than aesthetic value on
biodiversity. In Monteverde for example, the local population draws large economic benefit
from the large-scale eco-tourism that floods the region yearly. Monteverde Cloud Forest
Preserve Director Carlos Hernández supports this trend and claims that in order for the
surrounding community to appreciate and want to conserve an area’s biodiversity and forested
area, they have to see its economic benefits (Hernández, personal communication).
Many, conservationists especially, adopt a more minimalist approach to further
development which would interfere with intact forest coverage and biodiversity. These
individuals would rather see more wildlife and forest reserves with surrounding communities
prohibited from entering and using the environmental resources to support their own livelihood.
It is questionable whether or not SINAC’s sustainable development objective will compromise
biodiversity protection in the future. As of now, however, patterns of development have not
changed after SINAC enough to declare them a definite threat to current biodiversity protection
(Hernández, personal communication).
PRO. Costa Rica is still ahead of the game because it makes sustainability a concern for
development and land use more than most other Latin American countries. In 1994 the country
even declared “sustainable development to be a national objective” (World Bank 2000). Earlier
policies have not been very conscious of sustainable needs, but the fact that the country has
discussed its importance puts it further ahead than neighboring countries still developing their
own.
Promoting sustainable usage of environmental services might lead to overexploitation of
biological resources, but there is another possible outcome for the environmental benefits felt by
the surrounding population. When individuals, employees especially, can visualize how much
environmental benefits can provide large economic returns and support themselves, their
communities, like Monteverde, may become more environmentally conscious (Hernández,
personal communication). Gaining its economic benefits might urge them to use the
environment in a sustainable fashion so that it can continue to yield economic profit.
A key feature of the SINAC change included drawing more participation from local
communities. Conceptually, this change might further conservation positively for a number of
reasons. Local people may be more likely to care for their immediate surroundings than an
executive in San Jose. Regional projects would more directly affect them so their active
participation might be considered more legitimate in decision making and planning.
Conservation Issues.
CON. Because SINAC is responsible for usage of natural resources, its management could
have a large effect on whether or not these resources are overexploited. This was not an
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observed result but the possibility is anticipated by many who lack faith in SINAC’s ability to
manage biodiversity and natural resources with equitable attention.
Others have claimed that after the implementation of SINAC, they noticed less personnel
coming out into the field to monitor the conservation areas. Anselmo Flores Reyes, leader of the
Terraba Indigenous Reserve, claimed that personnel from the General Forestry Directorate, the
former forestry agency in Costa Rica, used to visit his region often to monitor and inspect the
wood-cutting occurring often. He noted that personnel from SINAC Conservation Areas visit
less often and accomplish little when they do visit (Evans 1999).
Local biodiversity and habitat still suffer threats in some areas. The director of the Coco
Island Conservation Area noted current threats to biodiversity and resource use in his area,
including illegal fishing, introduced exotic species and inefficient management, tourism
regulation and financial practices (Quiros, personal communication).
Reyes also complained that SINAC officials do not enforce regulations in his
Conservation Area because they have done little to battle issues like heavy deforestation and
endangered watersheds still threatening his region. Regulations regarding wood-cutting have
been implemented, yet he reports that neither the police nor anyone else does much to enforce
them (Evans 1999).
PRO. The director from the Coco Island Conservation Area (ACMIC) claimed that there are
projects in progress to monitor the area more effectively and for tourism (Quiros, personal
communication). He stated in his questionnaire that his AC did monitor their Protected Wildlife
Areas from 2000-2004 but stopped after this time.
The Biodiversity Law No. 7788 legalized SINAC in 1998. This law necessitated that
efforts regarding biodiversity conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources should be
distributed justly according to their benefits and costs (SINAC website, 2007). This is a key law
because it states that each Conservation Area should be returned 100% of the profit they
produce. 100% return of money generated would help the ACs substantially, but this part of the
law has yet to be realized (Gamboa, personal communication).
SINAC has also required many of its regional employees to take environmental education
courses. This can help the quality of conservation planning and decision-making in the ACs
because people will be better informed about conservation in their respective areas. It will also
be more practical for locals to make decisions about how the surrounding natural resources are
utilized (Bonilla, personal communication).
Financial Issues
CON. Inefficient funding practices are the largest problem threatening conservation success in
Costa Rica. With the changes under SINAC, it is only the National Parks System that funds all
other activities in all of Costa Rica’s conservation areas (Hernández, personal communication).
Wildlife reserves do not generate money because they are not open to the public and do not
generate revenue from entrance fees. There is also a law stating that money produced in the
forestry department is utilized outside of SINAC’s jurisdiction. Of Costa Rica’s national parks,
it is generally Poás, Irazú, Tortuguero, Carara, Manuel Antonio and Arenal that cover activities
and operative costs of other regions (Hernández, personal communication).
Jorge Gamboa claimed that there is enough money returned to the central government to
allow SINAC to run successfully in each AC. The problem is, however, that when the
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conservation regions receive money back from the central government, they receive a very small
percentage and sometimes nothing at all. Poas National Park, for example, generates
approximately eight-hundred thousand US dollars annually and the park has not received any
money back from the central government in the last three years (Murrillo, personal
communication). In 2006, only 27% of the total money generated this year by the national parks
returned to the country’s conservation areas (Gamboa, personal communication).
Because the money generated by conservation areas has a public stamp on it, the money
is returned to the Ministerio de Hacienda and the Controloria in the central government. These
two governing bodies choose how to divvy up these funds and where to allocate them. Because
they are public funds, these agencies can use them for any administrative costs they choose to or
in other ministries, which is often the case (Gamboa, personal communication). These funds
travel straight from the national parks into the central governments pot of public revenue and
SINAC and MINAE do not touch these funds in the interim. There is also no fixed percentage of
annual return by the central government. Thus, conservation areas cannot anticipate how much
of their revenues the government will return because these figures can change yearly.
Private reserves and organizations like the MCL (Monteverde Conservation League) and
the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve are better able to manage their money because they are
private funds. At the Monteverde Cloud Forest Reserve, for example, all of their revenue goes to
the Tropical Science Center. Of that money, 70% is returned directly to the reserve for their own
use and management. 15% of the remaining 30% goes to the bank to generate interests as a
safety fund and the other 15% goes to the Tropical Science Center (Hernández, personal
communication). Their money travels more efficiently than does the national system and this
reserve operates on a very small scale. Their success might be evidence of the potential success
of decentralized conservation areas who mainly suffer from lack of funding.
Once the small percentages are returned to conservation areas, MINAE does not
participate in deciding how much money each conservation area receives. The central
government assigns these values and they also dictate how these funds should be utilized in each
area. When the central government advises areas on how to use their money, they often require
regions to act most frugally and purchase at the cheapest rates. These restrictions can often leave
parks, reserves and other areas with low quality operations (Hernández, personal
communication).
Several regions often do not even have enough money from the central government to
cover their basic operative costs. On the Coco Island Conservation Area, for instance, the
director reported that for 2007 they anticipate operative costs of about 1,600 US dollars. He said
that these estimations often surpass what the central government will give for operative costs
(Quiros, personal communication).
There has been a decrease in international funding provided to Costa Rica in recent years
but this trend is attributed to different reasons. Walter Bonilla and Carlos Hernández claim that
Costa Rica received more funding from 1986-1996 because it stood out among all the less
developed countries because it had a democracy, lacked an army and invested heavily in health
and education (Bonilla & Hernández, personal communication). Now that other neighboring
countries are beginning to develop themselves and raise awareness for protecting their
environments, international aid has shifted its attention across more countries (Hernández,
personal communication). Others believe, however, that Costa Rica has become a less popular
target for international aid because of the birth of SINAC. These sources claim that recently that
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the Canadian government diverted funding from Costa Rica to Nicaragua because of the SINAC
change (Evans 1999)
PRO. Some conservation areas are able to depend on outside sources of funding. In Poas
National Park, for example, they annually receive 3-5% of their money from NGO’s.
FUNDECOR also manages the parking lot at Poas and because it does not have to submit the
money generated by parking fees to the central government, it can return everything to the park
for its own usage. Costa Rica’s Tropical Science Center runs the same operation in the park’s
cafeteria. Here, 100% of profits in the cafeteria the Center return to the park. FUNDECOR and
the Tropical Science Center manage parking lots and cafeterias in Irazú National Park also.
The Coco Island Conservation Area will receive international aid from FAICO this year
to cover operative costs but they will receive about 60 US dollars, which is about 20% of costs
received by the AC to this point this year (Quiros, personal communication).
The financial issues facing conservation plans in Costa Rica might be resolved in the near
future, however. Biodiversity law No.7788 states that 100% of the money generated by national
parks has to return to the conservation areas and that the government has to set aside a special
budget for managing conservation areas. The beginnings of such a budget, the conservation
budget project, are now in parliament and should soon become a legalized reserve of money just
for conservation areas. One bank will receive and manage all the generated funds and return the
money back to the conservation areas (Gamboa, personal communication).
Administrative/Operative Issues.
CON.
SINAC still lacks enough personnel to handle all the responsibilities in all the
conservation areas adequately. On the OSA peninsula, for instance, there were only 3 staff
members monitoring the area as late as 1998 (Brockett and Gottfried 2002). Because money is
usually located away from conservation interests, there are not enough funds to hire more
personnel. Poas National Park has about ten people working to cover an area of 6,000 hectares
and in Palo Verde National Park there are about twenty people working to cover a range of
20,000 hectares (Hernández, personal communication).
Conservationists like Walter Bonilla and Carlos Hernández support the SINAC
philosophy and the efforts to decentralize efforts away from one central location. They also
believe the areas cannot perform ideally at this point because they are deprived the resources
they need (Hernández, personal communication). For them, inefficiency in the handling of
conservation is likely more a result of limited funding than it is SINAC’s organization.
There is also lots of bureaucracy in areas and this can decrease management efficiency.
Walter Bonilla was a former accountant and he noted problems between transferring financial
figures to the central government and back to the park. If there were problems with documents
or figures, he would have to redo his work, resubmit it to the government and the process took a
long time. The central government and its ministries have also often been accused of corruption
and bureaucracy (Bonilla, personal communication).
Many believe that the SINAC is a good model for administration, but that it does not
receive enough support from the government. Instead, the government is more dedicated to
interests of transnational companies whose motives might counter conservation regulations under
SINAC (Mora 1999). Thus, some are concerned that if the central government does not strongly
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support SINAC, others will not support it. Others have also claimed that MINAE is not always a
supportive ministry, either (Mora 1999).
Conservation Areas also often have very poor conditions in their facilities. In Poas
National Park, for example, there is one women’s bathroom with five stalls and one men’s
bathroom with four stalls. These restroom facilities are what the park has to accommodate their
250,000 annual visitors. Parks can often even lack money to purchase enough toilet paper
(Hernández, personal communication).
PRO. While there are still not enough employees to manage all the conservation areas
efficiently, there have been some gains since the birth of SINAC. In ACMIC, the Coco Island
Conservation Area, they employed seven guards before the SINAC changes and now employ
eighteen guards (Quiros, personal communication). This AC also only employed eight
administrative workers before SINAC but they now have twenty-eight people working (Quiros,
personal communication). Walter Bonilla, a former employee of SINAC, also noticed that
SINAC has increased the amount of environmental education required by SINAC employees and
most of them are better prepared to deal with administrative duties in their area (Bonilla,
personal communication).
With SINAC and the biodiversity law also came an increase in regional councils and
bodies that meet together to discuss conservation agendas in the ACs. These can be forums
where regional employees and local community members discuss opinions and brainstorm
projects for improved management in the areas (Quiros, personal communication).
One improvement from the decentralization of management is that if a party in a
conservation area wants to implement a project, they had to travel to San Jose in the past to get
permission from the central office. Now that power is decentralized, they only have to go to
their local office to get permission at a lesser inconvenience (Hernández, personal
communication).
Another benefit of SINAC is that it allows to richer areas of Costa Rica to fund those
areas that do not generate enough revenue to support themselves on their own. Before SINAC,
there were separate territories controlled by different ministries. Now that all areas fall under the
same ministry, wealthier places like the popular national parks can help support the entire
system. This kind of group cooperation is necessary especially for regions like AC Amistad
Caribe whose area only receives about 1,000 paying visitors per year (Hernández, personal
communication).
Suggestions
The scope of Conservation in Costa Rica is threatened by more than just a shift in administration.
SINAC established a philosophy that is very different from the previous organization of
conservation agencies, yet whether or not these differences will be for the greater improvement
of conservation in Costa Rica is not yet evident. Most critics disagreed with the SINAC
philosophy because it would transfer power to local regions and because it included the
management of sustainable resources. These are valid worries but they are not problems with
SINAC that are obvious at the present time. What is most obvious is that the conservation
structure is most threatened by the way money is handled.
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The areas would benefit however, from a policy requiring the Ministry of Tourism to
support conservation areas since so much of their profits derive from the wildlife that
conservation areas work to preserve.
In the future, areas need 100% of revenues from national parks to be returned to the
system so that personnel, facilities, sustainable development and biodiversity protection can all
receive more funding than they do now.
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APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CARLOS HERNANDEZ AND WALTER BONILLA
1. For how long were you employed by SINAC or MINAE and what kind of occupation
did you fill?
2. Do you think that the de-concentration changes under SINAC are have established or
are going to establish a conservation system more efficient than before than SINAC?
3. Do you think Conservation Areas will implement more economic and sustainable
projects than those for biodiversity protection?
4. Has your private reserve or organization worked with SINAC on any projects? Have
you collaborated with SINAC on conservation projects or related projects in the past?
If so, what do you think was their general attitude towards biodiversity protection?
5. Do you think the changes in conservation policy that came along with SINAC are
going to jeopardize or reduce the conservation successes Costa Rica has had in the
past?
6. Do you think these changes have reduce or will reduce international aid for Costa
Rica?
7. Do you think that each Conservation Area receives the same amount of funding from
the government and other outside resources? Or do you think there is a discrepancy in
the amount of money that different areas receive?
8. Do you notice a change in the Monteverde area that reflects the changes under
SINAC? Do you think development receives more attention that biodiversity
protection from the local MINAE location?
9. Do you think there is anything SINAC can do to improve its management of
conservation, biodiversity, sustainable development and resource use?

APPENDIX 2
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CONSERVATION AREA DIRECTORS
1. How many guards were employed before SINAC came into being and how many do
you have employed now?
2. What do you hold a degree in? What was your former occupation before being
employed by SINAC/MINAE?
3. Have the conditions of the facilities at all improved or deteriorated since the
consolidation of SINAC conservation areas? Have there been any RECENT
construction projects?
4. SINAC states that areas are supposed to generate 50% of their funding on their own,
including general entrance fees, research permits, charges from environmental
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sources. How much of this 50% component of your incoming funding is selfgenerated?
5. How many projects have been implemented in the last five years that were geared
towards economic and sustainable development? How many projects have been
implemented strictly for biodiversity protection?
6. SINAC states that 15% of funding for each area should come from international aid.
How much international aid funds your efforts?
7. SINAC states that 15% of funding for each area should come from endowments, trust
funds and debt swaps. How much do you think your area receives from these
sources?
8. SINAC states that 20% of funding for each area should come from the CR gov’t.
How much money do you annually receive from the CR government?
9. To what degree do you think the local community is involved in SINAC initiatives?
Very Involved, Somewhat Involved, and Not Involved at All?
10. If the local community is at least somewhat involved, how so? How does the
community contribute to decisions made in each conservation area?
11. How many people are currently employed in your area/office? How many people
were employed before the consolidation under SINAC?
12. What are the main land-use problems in your region that require projects for
sustainable development and resources use
13. Do you think conservation for biodiversity protection in your area benefits more from
more regional control or would it benefit more from a main control center (e.g. San
Jose main location)?
14. Do you monitor the conservation areas you oversee? If so, what criteria do you rate
them by? How often are these reviews performed?
15. Have you gained more forested area since SINAC came into play? If so, how many
hectares?
16. What are the developmental pressures still threatening biodiversity protection and
sustainability in your areas.
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